Ending the Civil War by “Borrowing U.S. Troops”: An Unconventional Proposal for Venezuela’s Democratic Transition

 


Ending the Civil War by “Borrowing U.S. Troops”: An Unconventional Proposal for Venezuela’s Democratic Transition


Hello everyone, welcome back to USNSNews. I’m Charlie Chan.

Venezuela’s problem can no longer be reduced to a simple narrative of “opposing dictatorship and embracing democracy.” The reality is clear: years of economic collapse, institutional paralysis, political polarization, and deep social fragmentation have made any attempt to overthrow the current regime through domestic violent revolution highly likely to degenerate into a high-intensity civil war—one that would ultimately consume the most innocent ordinary citizens.

It is precisely under these conditions that we must seriously discuss an option that is neither pleasant nor emotionally satisfying, and may even feel morally uncomfortable, yet may be closer to political realism: minimizing bloodshed by ending internal disorder through external forces of order.

Under this framework, if María Corina Machado is already outside Venezuela, her role should no longer be that of a conventional opposition politician. Instead, she should assume the role of a symbolic bearer of transitional national order. Her first step would be to promote the establishment of a provisional government whose sole and explicit mandate is to end civil conflict and restore constitutional governance.

This provisional government would not be intended to rule indefinitely. Its core mission would be limited to three objectives:
first, to deny the legitimacy of the current regime;
second, to secure international recognition;
and third, within the framework of international order, to formally request external intervention to suppress what is, in effect, a domestic political insurgency.

Such a provisional government should formally submit a request to the Trump administration to “borrow troops,” framing the action as the suppression of domestic rebellion and the restoration of democratic constitutional order, rather than an invasion—emphasizing humanitarian necessity and democratic recovery.

Under international law and real-world political constraints, any external military intervention must be framed as order restoration, not ideological export. Accordingly, the provisional government should actively seek political and security support from the United States and other democratic nations, and make clear, written commitments that any military action would be strictly limited to ending violent conflict, not occupation or plunder; and that once the mission is complete, all foreign forces would withdraw in accordance with agreed terms.

As compensation for the risks and costs borne by external states, the new government could assume responsibility—through sovereign loans—for operational expenses, compensation for casualties, and related costs, to be repaid gradually once normal fiscal order is restored. It could also establish a “Democracy Contribution Fund” to reward participating U.S. troops and individuals who made significant contributions to the restoration of democracy. This would not constitute a “sale of sovereignty,” but rather the unavoidable price a failed state must pay in order to stand again.

However, any political order established with external support is destined to be short-lived if it lacks internal reconciliation as its foundation. Thus, the decisive factor in this plan is not military success, but the design of domestic reconciliation mechanisms.

From the very outset, the new government should legislatively affirm a principle that is highly controversial yet crucial to ending conflict: conditional, comprehensive political amnesty. Any military, political, or judicial personnel—including the Maduro family and its core inner circle—who defect before the establishment of the new order, recognize the legitimacy of the new constitution and government, and cease supporting the old regime, would be granted full amnesty for political acts committed under the previous government in the name of “maintaining regime stability.” Their legally acquired family property would not be confiscated, and their personal safety would be institutionally guaranteed.

In exchange, they must permanently withdraw from political power struggles and refrain from undermining the new constitutional order. All former military, political, and judicial personnel who defect and support the new government would be retained initially; their future positions would then be determined through assessment under the new legal system, based on competence and qualifications.

This is not a moral whitewashing of the past, but a deliberate political choice: abandoning comprehensive reckoning in exchange for an end to bloodshed. History has repeatedly shown that when a state stands on the brink of collapse, total accountability rarely produces justice—more often, it produces new wars.

At the same time, the new government should establish a National Reconciliation and Truth Commission, whose function would not be judicial prosecution but historical documentation and public narrative. Drawing on the South African experience, the commission would allow victims to recount their suffering and perpetrators to explain their actions, without criminal prosecution, without victor’s justice, and without constructing new hierarchies of political morality.

Its sole purpose would be to leave the nation with a shared, officially acknowledged historical memory—so that future political competition would no longer be mobilized around the promise of “re-settling old scores.”

At the level of institutional reconstruction, the new government should explicitly follow the post–World War II model of Germany and Japan: external assistance combined with internal restructuring. With the help of international experts—particularly constitutional and legal scholars from the United States and other democratic nations—it should draft a pro-democracy constitution emphasizing local autonomy, press freedom, checks and balances, and the depoliticization of the military.

Reforms of the armed forces, judiciary, police, and internal security services must be embedded within the constitutional framework, not driven by personal will or political purges. For rank-and-file soldiers, police officers, and civil servants, reintegration should be achieved through oaths of allegiance, retraining, and professional guarantees—rather than pushing them into despair and resistance.

It must be acknowledged that this is an extremely dangerous and deeply controversial path. It sacrifices certain emotionally satisfying demands for justice, suppresses the impulse for revenge, and risks accusations of “foreign manipulation.” But for a country already dragged into the abyss by prolonged failed governance, the real question is not how to choose the purest option, but how to choose the one that results in the fewest deaths, the least social rupture, and the greatest chance of sustainability.

If democracy is an institutional ideal, then peace is the soil in which democracy can take root. A revolution without order only breeds new tyranny; a victory without reconciliation merely plants the seeds of the next war. For Venezuela, true courage may lie not in fully settling accounts with the past, but in possessing the capacity—amid extreme suffering—to end civil war and begin again.


If you’ve made it this far, you may already realize that this is not a story overflowing with righteous indignation.
It offers no heroic narrative, no total reckoning, and no emotional gratification. It even asks people to accept a difficult truth: sometimes, for a nation to survive, it must abandon the fantasy of fully judging the past.

History repeatedly teaches us this:
revolutions without order tend to give birth to new despotism;
victories without reconciliation inevitably lead to the next war.

Democracy is not sustained by passion, nor built on hatred. What democracy truly requires is a society that, after immense suffering, still chooses not to destroy itself.

This path is dangerous, deeply contested, and extremely risky—but it at least confronts a question long avoided:
in a country that has already failed, what choice minimizes death, reduces division, and preserves a future?

If you find this realist perspective compelling, please consider sharing this video more widely so that Ms. María Corina Machado herself may see it.
You’re also welcome to like, subscribe to USNSNews, and share your dissenting views.

I’m Charlie Chan. See you next time.

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